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Shared academic governance in a university depends upon at least two preliminary 
factors: setting up democratic structures and having a President or Vice-Chancellor who 
believes in shared governance. However, to gain legitimacy other factors are necessary. 
An important ingredient is for the leader to gain the trust of the university community and 
for academics to commit themselves to shared governance. Nearly half a century ago, 
Eric Ashby identified how a Vice Chancellor (VC) who wants shared governance will 
differ from other leaders. 
He is the very antithesis of a headmaster or a general manager or a Roman 
Catholic bishop. Far from being a man charged with the responsibility of 
creating policy, he finds himself obliged to feed in ideas (if he has any) at 
the level of departments or faculties, and then patiently to watch them from 
the chair at numerous committees, percolating upwards toward the Council. 
(Ashby, 1958, p. 72) 
Eric Ashby used the term ‘first among equals’ to describe the more democratic leader 
in English universities. Professor Stephen Griew, the Foundation Vice Chancellor of 
Murdoch University, claims that it was this kind of vision that guided him in his attempts 
to establish democratic governance at Murdoch. This concept of the ‘first-amongst 
equals’ is still present at Murdoch according to Thurgate, a former Council president: The 
Vice Chancellor is not seen as being separate from the Academic Council or from the 
academic community. I think when the university works effectively there is not a division 
between what’s happening in Academic Council and what’s happening in the 
Chancellery.  
This paper describes the development of Murdoch University’s Academic Council 
from its creation in 1973 to its current working in 2003, charting its strengths and 
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weaknesses. It draws upon my personal experience serving two terms on Murdoch 
University’s Council and interviews with 12 individuals who were or are currently on 
Council, and supporting documentation (council minutes, reviews and legislation).  
Based on research findings, democratic forms of university governance have benefits 
that are often lost in extreme forms of managerialism. Tapper and Palfreyman (2000) 
assert that it is a generally accepted idea that universities are better governed if their 
academic affairs are controlled by the faculty. Dopson and McNay (cited in Tapper & 
Palfreyman, 2000) concur: “Collegiality may not be efficient by the norms of other 
organizations, but it may be more effective in achieving the outcome of a ‘good 
university’ than rampant managerialism” (p. 20). Further, Newson (1998) argues the 
importance of developing democratic sensibilities, suggesting that the university is one 
place where democratic practices should be insistently put forward. 
In contrast to these positive views of democratic decision making, de Boer and 
Huisman (1999) state that advocates of ‘new public management’ believe one tenet of 
good management is that “managers should be given the ‘right to manage’, i. e. the 
freedom to make decisions about the use of organizational resources to achieve desired 
outcomes” (p. 111). In today’s climate many universities are attempting a synthesis of 
collegiality and managerialism. 
University Governance: From Collegial to Managerial 
Each university is shaped by its history, by the particular time and place in which it is 
created, and then reconstructed by external forces and its internal dynamics. Many 
universities today are influenced by neoliberal economic forces bringing into greater play 
the role of managers in the governance of institutions. Collegiate traditions may persist at 
the departmental level in some institutions; however, managerial trends are increasingly 
introduced for strategic purposes. 
In Australia during the last decade, there was a push for smaller boards, for more 
external involvement in universities and the need for what was seen as greater efficiency 
and managerial prerogative. In fact, top-down forms of management became the 
dominant governance model in most Anglo-American universities. Dill and Helm (1988) 
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in their research in the United States observed an evolution towards a reduced role for 
faculty. They delineated three periods that faculty participation goes through: “faculty 
control, democratic participation and strategic policy making”.  There were traces of all 
three of these stages in the 30-year period at Murdoch. With a small Council in the initial 
ten years, faculty and administrators were seen as working together, more as academic 
colleagues without any split between administrators and faculty so it could be said that 
governance was in the control of faculty. In the middle years Council became larger, 
more representative and democratic participation could characterize it. Towards the end 
of the 1990s there was a greater emphasis on managerialism and a shift in focus to 
strategic policy. 
Three Murdoch professors interviewed for this study referred to the corporatisation of 
Australian universities and the pressures exerted on collegiality in the current climate. 
Very difficult to recapture the collegiality of the 1960s and 1970s that I knew while 
workloads remain as high as they are at the moment (De Garis). Harris expressed a 
similar feeling: Academic Council is not as effective as I would like it to be in 
counteracting the corporatization of the university. Bolton argued for the need for a 
collegial body to exist as a bulwark against the managerial model being thrust on 
Australian universities by Canberra. I believe that in a climate where the federal 
government is trying to push top-down management, a strong and experienced Academic 
Council is necessary to maintain the traditions that universities have been running on for 
800 or 900 years.  
History of Murdoch University’s Academic Council 
The university started with 672 students in 1975 and has grown to more than 12,000 
students and 1200 staff members in 2003. It also hosts some 2000 overseas students from 
40 countries. During its history, it has faced various external pressures from threats to 
close it to the decrease from 90% to 60% in government funding. Correspondingly, its 
Academic Council has gone through a series of reviews and changes to its size, its 
composition, and its ways of operating. 
This history focuses on three periods demarcating the restructuring of Academic 
Council: the origins of Academic Council under the Foundation Vice-Chancellor, 
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Professor Stephen Griew (1973-1978); the period when Professor Steven Schwartz 
became Vice-Chancellor (1996-2001) and enlarged Academic Council; and the 
installation of a new Vice-Chancellor, Professor John Yovich (2002 to 2003) and another 
review of Council. It is clear that the personalities of these three Vice-Chancellors 
influenced the culture of Council. These differences are captured in a quote from Andrew 
Bain, the current University Secretary, who has been at Murdoch for the 30-year period 
under examination. 
The first VC was Stephen Griew and because of the way the university 
grew up, there was a strong bond among the foundation staff. Most of us 
used to have lunch together. . . .  Later Steven Schwartz became VC and 
was more of a top down person. By then the place was larger; and there 
was also enterprise bargaining and I think that put academic staff in more 
conflict with management unfortunately. What this has meant is that 
instead of the university as a group competing with the government to get 
money, the conflict has been all internal so there are people fighting each 
other. Now with John Yovich as VC, I think we are swinging back to the 
staff because I think John has a much greater empathy for the academic 
staff and them with him and also his management style is much more 
inclusive. He’s the sort of person who likes to walk around, meet people 
and talk things through. There’s a feeling that he is actually going to take 
the place somewhere. 
During the initial years, Murdoch was clearly seen as an alternative university, yet a 
quality university with the highest percentage of academics with PhDs in Austrlaia 
(75%). It recruited academics from other states in Australia and internationally, mainly 
from Great Britain and the North America. However, soon after its creation, the Federal 
economy worsened and enrolments did not grow as fast as predicted. Consequently there 
were calls from many quarters to close the university. These threats resulted in moves by 
the university to retreat from some of its more radical ideas. In the 1990s there were 
attempts to merge Murdoch with other universities in the state. A planned merger with 
the University of Western Australia (UWA) almost succeeded. Thus, throughout its brief 
history, Murdoch has struggled to exert its independent identity within a fairly 
conservative and threatening environment. Its Council has had to be strong and it appears 
to have survived as a forum where good debate takes place, dissenting voices can be 
heard and problem-solving is seen as one of its fortés. 
The university was named after Walter Murdoch, a distinguished English Professor at 
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UWA, who was well known for his famous dictum, “Challenge the accepted.” From its 
initial conception, Murdoch University challenged accepted traditions and its Council 
exemplified this. The reasoning behind its structure is best described by Andrew Bain, 
University Secretary. 
I think in terms of setting up the initial Academic Council there were really 
two influences. One was UWA and it was felt the UWA model was something 
to avoid because they basically had a Professorial Board. At Murdoch it was 
firstly felt that the Professorial Board was too large and secondly why should 
it just be the Professors that run the show. So there was a conscious move 
away from that. Second, looking at what happened at the new universities like 
La Trobe, Macquarie, and Deakin, universities that were created in a similar 
time, the move was away from God Professors. It was just natural that there 
would be an academic body that included academic staff, not just God 
Professors, and that was relatively small.   
Bolton noted, We were trying to devise something which would be much more 
representative of all the interests across the university with a strong input from students 
and non-professorial staff. What later became known as the “Murdoch ethos” was an 
essential ingredient in many aspects of the organisational culture the university 
developed. As Griew described it: The Murdoch ethos was a spirit and an attitude that 
Murdoch would do things differently. If UWA was seen as formal and arrogant towards 
students, Murdoch would be seen as friendly and informal in its relationship with 
students. If UWA was seen as not taking teaching seriously, Murdoch would be seen as 
focusing equally on research and teaching. If UWA was seen as hierarchical in its 
governance structures, Murdoch would be democratic and open. The first five years of 
Murdoch were seen as the start of a new venture and there was much enthusiasm about 
working together for the good of the University. It was a time of high ideals and hope 
(Gawthorne). Collegiality, in the sense of creating a scholarly community, was 
envisioned for Murdoch.  
The “Murdoch ethos” has not disappeared. Professor Yovich, the current Vice-
Chancellor, referred to it as an “often talked about but elusive to describe quality” in an 
article entitled “Embracing the Murdoch Ethos”.  
Murdoch is differentiated from other institutions by the emphasis placed on 
diversity, human values, and sustainable solutions in the pursuit of our 
mission. Indeed, these characteristics set us apart. But the Murdoch ethos is 
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much more than this – it encompasses a commitment and loyalty to the 
broad Murdoch community. (Yovich, 2002, p. 2) 
 It was clear from the beginning that a democratic council that was representative of 
the broad community would be in keeping with the Murdoch ethos. Over the 30 year 
period, those interviewed felt that Council had embraced the Murdoch ethos though there 
were times when this was threatened.  For most of the time it operated on a collegial 
basis with a great deal of trust displayed between the senior managers and the elected 
members of Council (academic and general staff and students). However, there were 
times when a lack of trust developed. The strengths of Council identified by those 
interviewed were its size and its representativeness, its respected membership, its 
informal and consensual decision-making process and its ability to solve problems facing 
the university. The weaknesses noted were its lack of budgetary oversight and the lack of 
involvement of some members. Here I begin with the strengths, then discuss the 
weaknesses and finally describe two significant changes over this time period (in the 
relationship of trust and the introduction of Question Time). 
Strengths of Council 
Size and Representativeness 
In the beginning Council was very small because of the size of the university in 1974, 
having 17 members of Council (12 administrators and 5 academics). By 1985 there were 
25 members (11 administrators and 14 academics and students). In the expansion of 
Council in 1996 three general staff, three more students, and five more academics were 
added. At its largest it was 36 members (11 administrators and 25 general and academic 
staff and students). The 1996 review described its purpose: “It would provide a forum for 
staff and student debate, acting as the collegial voice. Council would be the main locus of 
opinion of the University community on all policy matters affecting the University.” In 
2002 it was reduced to 29 (8 administrators and 21 staff and students) following another 
review but its purposes remained the same. 
Its smallness has allowed for a freer flow of debate, as noted by Warren: It was small 
enough for debate to take place. It was possible to shift policy, if not always stop it or 
develop it from scratch. Harris also mentions its small size as well as its 
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representativeness. I think the strengths lie in that it is still relatively small, that it has 
elected members, that there is an expectation that it should be able to make decisions, 
and that these decisions should not be sidelined to people who are considered to be the 
experts.  
After the 1996 changes, the Vice Chancellor Steven Schwartz called Council “the 
Parliament of the university”. Bain comments on this change and how the Vice 
Chancellor felt at the time. 
Later he [VC] regretted this[calling it a Parliament] because it had 
connotations that went further than what he actually wanted or maybe he 
changed his mind. I mean a Parliament implies that it is the body to which 
the executive is responsible and it has legislative powers and has oversight 
of the entire operations of the whole organization. I think it also 
encouraged some academic staff to believe that Academic Council rather 
than Senate was the primary decision-making body in the university, so that 
created expectations that could not be fulfilled.  
In commenting on whether these changes improved the workings of council, 
Gawthorne noted that it did not: It confused the role of Council as the supreme academic 
body of the university with a forum for airing grievances. Another professor agreed. 
I don’t think the Parliament model is really an appropriate one for a 
university, no. Our state and federal parliaments are fairly powerless 
bodies themselves. They are commonly referred to as talking shops and the 
real decisions are made by the executives of the public service. The 
oppositional model is not really a helpful one. I would much rather see a 
group, in a collegial way, working together towards an outcome that 
satisfies everybody. In practice that’s a little idealistic. Nevertheless, I’ve 
found that when VCs approach the board in that kind of spirit, they get a 
very good response. (de Garis)  
There were others who felt the move was justified to expand council and make it a 
more representative body. 
When you’ve got elected members, there’s a sense that at least Academic 
Council is the parliament of the university, then accountability flows back 
to the constituents. And certainly as an elected member, I felt that I needed 
to canvas opinion among colleagues and I couldn’t always just speak in my 
own voice and figure out, particularly in the Social Sciences, what people 
were saying, thinking, and feeling. And then I would go back to the people 
and let them know what happened. (Harris)  
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The idea of a parliament as the principal body where academic decisions would take 
place may still be achievable at Murdoch. At the time it was introduced, however, there 
were tensions between the VC and academic staff that threatened the legitimacy of 
council. Governance began to drift away from Council as more decisions were taken in 
secret by the Senior Executive Group.  
Informal, Consensual Procedures 
In the early years due to its very small size, Council was informal enough that people 
tried out new ideas and it brought people closer together by hearing ideas from a range of 
perspectives. The consensual manner in which it operated is depicted in these two quotes 
from founding members. Everybody had a feeling of belonging, being on the same team; 
the place was going somewhere and trying to do something different. (Bain) As I 
recollect for the first year or so there was a sense of euphoria – everything was possible. 
This was intended to be a much more consensual university but one in which everybody 
had a voice. (Bolton) 
Comparing experiences at other universities (UWA and Wellington), Harris noted 
the effectiveness of the enlarged Council in 1997 and the fact that it still managed to sit 
around one large table.  
Taking UWA first, I was very conscious of my gender because it was a 
parliament of older males and it was held in an imposing room and all of 
the procedures were highly formal. You weren’t sitting around a table; 
you were sitting in a tiered lecture hall and it felt like a jury or something. 
I think I very rarely spoke or was expected to. It didn’t seem to me like a 
place for debate but was more of an information-sharing session and 
when debates did take place the order of speech was fairly tightly 
controlled. Indeed, people made speeches as opposed to having a debate. I 
felt like I was a spectator to a performance. In New Zealand it was 
composed mainly of senior staff, generally male and people in their 50s or 
60s plus. The debate was livelier and was more politicized. At UWA it was 
more polite and people said things in turn. In New Zealand I could pick up 
very quickly the nature of the ideological debate in the community and I 
joined in on it fairly early on and didn’t feel self-conscious doing so. At 
Murdoch, we sat around a large table, with a much better gender mix and 
a much larger proportion of elected academics and there was a feeling 
that Academic Council was contributing to the university’s business. 
(Harris) 
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Respected, Elected Members 
The legitimacy of a decision-making body depends on the power it is given and also 
on the respect people give to its members. It was the consensus of those interviewed that 
there was respect for Council. It was seen as a legitimate governing institution and good 
academic leaders were elected to it. In the beginning Council included foundation 
professors as well as articulate, rational and assertive members from a variety of non-
professorial staff from a complete range of schools. They had already shown themselves 
as people who had the whole university on the centre of their radar scopes, rather than 
just their own narrow disciplinary interests, and their determination to take a university-
wide view of most problems brought to Council (Griew). There was agreement amongst 
the interviewees that good academic leaders were drawn to serve on Council. Generally I 
think people respected Council, it didn’t mean that they agreed with everything that came 
out of it, but it had legitimacy (Bain). You get a variety. In general I think they are good 
academics that get elected to Council (Harris). 
Having elections and people contesting the elections generally increases the 
legitimacy of the Council. There have been great people on it in the past and there are 
great people on it now. I think a really positive thing is the filling of places on Academic 
Council. They are real elections (Borowitzka). 
Problem-Solving, Effective Body 
From its origins in 1973, Griew noted the effectiveness of Council in that decisions 
were to be the final ones (not overturned by the Senate or the Executive). The fact that 
Council was to be the principal body making policies and setting academic priorities 
enabled it to be seen as a legitimate and powerful body. Another important principle was 
to encourage real discussion of fundamental academic issues and priorities and avoid a 
rubber-stamping function by Council by limiting its size drastically (Griew). 
 Harris commented on her experience in different universities and felt that Murdoch’s 
Council was the most effective of the three she experienced. In terms of a decision-
making body, UWA was a performance body, Wellington was a debating body and 
Murdoch was most effective as a decision-making body. But there are a lot of things that 
get in the way of the potential. 
 10 
Several members including the current and past presidents mentioned its ability to 
solve problems.  . . . you bring together a range of expertise. . .  to bear on problems that 
don’t have obvious answers. That’s how it adds value and I’ve seen that work time and 
time again where you say I’ve never thought of that as an answer but it works 
(Thurgate). So, yes it does achieve things and the reason it works in the end is the people. 
It’s quite a reasonably sized group that is very effective. They ask hard questions and 
enunciate their points very well, whether you agree with them or not. Council is engaged 
with the issues and that’s what makes it effective. (Borowitzka) I think it is very 
important to have a forum to debate academic issues. When it works well as a collegial 
body and both executive members and elected academics act together to solve problems, 
then it is very effective. When Academic Council works best, it is great at problem 
solving. (Thiele)  
Besides commenting on its effectiveness, Warren and de Garis added another 
characteristic, freedom of speech, which was apparent in Council. I thought it was quite 
effective in that period when I was on it. It was hard and painful but it was quite a 
critical period in the history of the university. People felt it was possible to speak their 
minds (Warren). It did bring together people from most parts of the campus and it 
created an environment in which they were prepared to speak up. It did develop some 
quite effective policies on academic issues (de Garis). 
Weaknesses 
Lack of Budgetary Oversight 
A recurring theme over the thirty-year period and particularly during the last decade 
was the role of monitoring the budget. In the earlier period, a permanent, representative 
committee was given that role and this seemed to work well. When this committee was 
disbanded in 1996, the role of monitoring the budget lapsed and then was only partially 
returned to Council. Since that time, monitoring the budget has been fairly ineffective. 
Essentially the Senior Executive Group prepares the budget and then the deputy vice 
chancellor (DVC) explains changes from the previous year in the strategic allocations of 
the budget. Council is asked to comment on this draft budget. In the past, when questions 
were asked about line items (e.g. the amount in the VC’s budget), this was considered to 
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be too detailed. Even when querying the proportional divide between the Chancellery and 
the Divisions, the answer was often camouflaged behind different accounting procedures 
from one year to the next. As teaching budgets steadily declined during the 1990s, the 
tension over the budget became more acute. Currently there is no forum in the university 
monitor the budget in a transparent manner.  
Even though the 1996 review introduced a statement of purpose regarding budgetary 
oversight: “To exercise oversight of the management of the University, including 
scrutiny of the budget,” Council did not effectively achieve this. The brief attempt to 
achieve this, however, was seen as a critical moment. All the budget stuff, as difficult as it 
was, I thought we really had to have that responsibility to challenge, question, and make 
them justify every penny they spent (Warren). Yet, in the end, Council was bypassed and 
was seen by the Senior Executive Group as meddling in an area it had no statutory 
responsibility. Andrew Bain explains:  
Academic Council was never involved in the budget. The 1996 review said 
that it should be involved in setting the draft budget and we tried to work 
that t hrough in the budget committee, but that really did not get very far. 
Then there was a feeling that Council was getting into the minutia and 
debating whether there should be 40 or 50 thousand for that one item. 
Some were trying to manage the budget, which was not the role of 
Council. The up-shot of that was a more sensible move to look at the 
budget strategically. Council has two cuts at it, one is in setting up the 
parameters for the budget and the other is to see the final budget, get a 
report on what the major changes were and the issues compared to last 
year. (Bain) 
Despite the ability to be partially involved in setting budgetary parameters, even the 
past president of Council saw the loss of oversight of the budget as nonsensical. 
Academic Council is empowered to look at academic issues but I can’t 
think of one academic issue that doesn’t have a budgetary consequence. 
So to say you can look at one side of the coin and not the other, I always 
thought was nonsense. How much are we going to spend on current 
operations and how much are we going to spend strategically. That should 
be the discussion and it has to be informed by the academic community. 
(Thurgate)  
De Garis also saw the lack of budgetary oversight as a weakness of Council. Its 
weaknesses were firstly that it had no input on financial matters and the whole idea that 
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you can have academic decision making divorced from resource decision making is 
ridiculous.   
Bain states the obvious when he says, I don’t think Council engages terribly much 
with the budget, not as much as it might. However, he may not be aware of the 
frustrations that Council members experience when trying to alter the way the budget is 
currently discussed. These are spelt out by Thiele.  
The question of the budget has been fraught with difficulty. The DVC 
presents the principles of the budget but that gives us little leeway to 
discuss the actual distribution of the budget. It is very difficult to get a 
handle on the budget since all the information is not presented and we are 
only allowed to comment on the principles that form the budget and not 
interrogate the budget per se.  So it is an exercise for show that leads to 
little feedback.  
 Lack of Involvement by Some Elected Members 
The workload of Council is considerable and elected members have to be highly 
committed to be effective as representatives of their constituencies. Elections to Council 
are sought after and members have been deemed to be much respected academics. 
However, there are always a few who seem to use their election on to Council as 
primarily an item to add to their CVs. There are people who put their hands up because 
they think it will be good for their careers and then they don’t speak because they think it 
will be very bad for their careers if they do (Harris).  
Some expressed a sense of disappointment that members do not seem to be as active 
as they should be on Council. A weakness of Academic Council has been a sense of 
futility among some of us about members who don’t seem to read their agendas, don’t 
engage, and then rubber stamp items by putting their hands up for just anything (Bell). 
Thiele noted the same phenomenon. 
The effectiveness depends upon the academic members being active 
participants. Often there are only a few of us who speak and are willing to 
serve on working parties and carry the majority of the load. There are 
many individuals who do not say much and seem to be there only to vote. 
They do not serve on working parties or contribute to the debate. They 
may be there to further their careers or to complain about something and 
after they have done their complaining about an issue, they contribute 
very little.  
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When asked to suggest changes to Academic Council, a few respondents felt that an 
allocation of workload to elected members might be a good solution. It was obvious that 
the time commitment was substantial. I really think the critical thing all along was were 
members able and prepared to put in the kind of time to make it work. It wasn’t enough 
to turn up; you had to read all the agenda papers and then be willing to speak up 
(Warren).  
Trust and Lack of Trust 
The modus operandi of the university in the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s was to 
openly discuss academic policies, which may have slowed down some decisions. As a 
result, it was recognised tha t there was a danger of not being able to act quickly on 
matters that needed a rapid response. In the 1990s as managerialism began to dominate 
the university, there was a move towards less transparency and more decisions were 
taken by the Senior Executive Group where no minutes were kept. As a result of the 
sudden change in how the university was governed, a breakdown in communication and 
trust between the executive and academics soon emerged. This was prompted in 1996 by 
the VC’s decision to dismantle most of the committees and to bypass Council on crucial 
decisions. The idea of Council as the Parliament of the university soon deteriorated. 
Harris demonstrated how easily an effective Council can be changed to a powerless one.  
When I was on Council, it became apparent how easy it was, sadly, to 
modify a body to ensure that senior executives made decisions before hand 
and voted as a block and really there was nothing or very little to stop the 
real dilution of decision-making power we thought Academic Council 
should have. I think it was crucial how the position of the deans changed 
everything; they went in and voted as a block and we’ve got the general 
staff and the administrators tending to work together so then it’s left to 
elected members and students to do the work. Amazingly we tried to do it 
but it was very hard work.  
Members of Council were partially successful in blocking proposed changes deemed 
harmful to the integrity of the university. Many members became active outside of 
Council as well, through strikes, protests, letters to the Senate and meetings with the 
Chancellor. We were joined by noisy protests by students who organized a sit- in and then 
a sleep- in at the Senate chambers. In separate, mass meetings, academics, students and 
general staff voted no-confidence in the VC. It was a time of great agitation. As Bolton, a 
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member of Senate at that time remarked: My sense was that when I got back on the 
Senate in 1999, after all those years away, Academic Council was certainly not highly 
regarded by the Chancellery. The tensions between academics and the Chancellery were 
growing and little trust remained. Council became a forum to block administrative 
initiatives and little consensus remained between the VC and the academic members of 
Council during the period 1996-2001. 
The current president reflected on how Council led the university through a bad patch. 
Yes, I think we’ve seen that over the last seven years it can be effective. We went through 
a bad patch and the Council actually took the lead then and went ahead quite well 
(Borowitzka). 
Another member saw how important Council can be as a counter balance to a strong 
executive. 
It is also a necessary check against a management that can become too 
remote from the organization and too narrowly focused on management 
priorities. What has altered the current working of Academic Council is 
the attitude of the VC and his willingness to listen to members of 
Academic Council. There is a greater sense of a collegial approach to 
issues. (Thiele) 
Bolton saw the atmosphere of trust as essential and notes how it is being restored with 
the appointment of a new VC. 
The essential thing that our present VC is doing well is to build up a sense 
of trust between the various sections. So even when there is a 
disagreement, it’s important that Academic Council feels that nothing 
relevant is being concealed from it and that wasn’t always the case in an 
earlier regime. 
Question Time: Effective or Not 
Keeping with the parliamentary procedures, another change alluded to above was the 
introduction of “Question Time”, where senior administrators could be asked a question 
about their “portfolios”. Question Time is a procedure used in Australia’s Parliament 
when any member can raise an issue with a Minister. Some questions are on notice, given 
to the Minister before the session, and others are without notice, asked spontaneously in 
Parliament. Before all the protests occurred at Murdoch University in 1998, Academic 
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Council was beginning to operate as the voice of the people and members used the forum 
to question actions taken by the executive. The VC often became visibly angry with the 
questions asked during Question Time, which defeated the purpose of the very procedure 
he introduced. 
Possibly as a result of the tension that Question Time raised in Council, Gawthorne 
felt that it did not improve Council. It would have been better if the VC had periodic 
university-wide forums in which staff could raise questions with or without notice. Others 
were more positive about Question Time.  
Yes, I think it can be good because I remember giving a question on notice 
about the budget, which meant that the VC couldn’t say I don’t have the 
data, I’ll have to go back and get it; when it’s on notice, you have to answer 
it. (Harris) 
Oddly he [the VC] introduced Question Time, which I thought was really 
important because it did give not only Council members as a whole but also 
ordinary academics who had a question had the chance to have it 
answered. A couple of times it became quite a critical point. (Warren) 
Well there certainly were occasions where people asked astute questions 
that drew out information we may not otherwise have had. I don’t think 
there is anything wrong in principle with Question Time but in practice, it 
didn’t usually work that well because people were apprehensive and 
therefore defensive. Having the mechanism there can’t do any harm. (de 
Garis) 
With the change in the atmosphere at Council to one of much greater trust in the VC, 
the need to ask questions without notice has lessened. At least for the present, few 
academics are raising questions about the portfolios of senior administrators.  
Yes, I think it was a good introduction but it’s changed. It’s only for 
questions with notice, not without notice, because some of the executives 
were worried about being put on the spot probably for political advantage. 
Someone might like to stump the VC with a question or issue he knows 
nothing about. And really we’re not a government and opposition, so that’s 
not fair in a way. (Bain) 
Although the current President of Council recognized that Question Time was a good 
institution to keep, he could see that since the change had occurred, it was rarely used. 
Now most questions relate to the VC’s report.  
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At the moment we are getting almost no questions on notice, haven’t had 
one for several meetings. On the other hand, there is always the opportunity 
to ask questions that are not on notice — the Vice-Chancellor’s report 
opens up that possibility. (Borowitzka) 
Discussion 
It is clear in the responses of this fairly diverse group of academics and administrators 
that Murdoch University’s Council is a robust body engaging in lively debate that has to 
continue to earn its legitimacy as an effective decision-making body. In identifying its 
strengths, most respondents noted its smallness, its representativeness and its ability to 
solve problems. The fact that it has regained a sense of trust between the senior executive 
and academic and general staff has increased its effectiveness. Question Time is still a 
part of Council but it is not used to embarrass management due to the restoration of a 
collegial atmosphere. In the final analysis, Council has bent towards the role of a 
strategic planner as identified by Dill and Helm (1988). Governance has shifted away 
from the early days of faculty control and towards greater top-down management. 
Although Murdoch may have developed a blend between managerial and democratic 
procedures in a more trusting atmosphere, the role of Council in monitoring the budget 
remains an unresolved issue. 
In examining some of the literature on university governance, it is worth exploring 
how Murdoch’s Academic Council fits with the prevailing models. Minor (20002) 
identified four models of faculty senates: functional, influential, dormant and subverted. 
In a later study Tierney and Minor (2003) classified the meaning of “shared governance” 
into three categories: fully collaborative, consultative, and distributed decision-making. 
Murdoch’s Council appears to fall into the categories of influential and fully 
collaborative. It has a collegial model of governance where faculty and managers make 
decisions jointly and consensus is the goal. It can initiate change on campus and is 
viewed as a partner in campus governance. It differs in some of its characteristics from 
these two models. For example, it is not exclusively composed of faculty. Perhaps 
because of this, it is involved in an agenda concerned with the entire university and not 
just faculty issues. Its composition, representative of the university, is identified as one of 
its strengths because its decisions are then more binding on the university community. 
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Lee (1991) concluded that campuses where presidents and provosts engaged with faculty 
senates were the ones where governance was perceived to be more effective. At 
Murdoch, managers cast their votes just as do the general staff, students, and academics. 
Only with great difficulty can managers nullify a decision made by Council.  
Williams et al. (1987 cited in Minor 2002) provide five categories of how faculty 
view their involvement in governance: collegial, activist, acceptors, hierarchicals and 
copers. Members of Council who were interviewed could be described as collegial in 
most circumstances, preferring to share governance with the executive. However, there 
were times when they were more activists, rejecting a strong managerial role in 
governance. Harris strongly expressed this feeling about Murdoch’s Council, If you think 
that the prime function of the university is promotion of academic ideals, then I actually 
think that we should define a far heavier weighting to academic interests on Academic 
Council. 
There was no hint of being ‘hierarchicals’, wanting a strong administrative role in 
governance or ‘copers’ just managing to get by with the status quo. The university was 
founded on a democratic platform and the academics attracted to it have maintained the 
“Murdoch ethos” of collegiality. However, there may have been changes over time in 
how democratic or collegial the university has been. There were periods in the history of 
Academic Council when there was disagreement about its role and some individuals may 
have viewed it as too activist and going beyond its statutory authority.  
A more telling difference with the US scene is in the greater satisfaction expressed 
about Academic Council. Most members interviewed felt that Academic Council was 
influential and saw it as a legitimate decision-making body, which is captured in this 
quote. I would say that we have a robust Academic Council. I have a strong sense that 
our Academic Council works well and it’s been quite effective (Bell). This is in contrast 
to the widespread dissatisfaction with faculty senates in the US. According to  Tierney & 
Minor (2003),“Dissatisfaction was particularly strong at doctoral universities, where only 
19 percent of respondents agreed that faculty has high levels of interest in Senate 
activities” (p. 6) .  
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Concluding Comments 
The effectiveness of governance boards is affected by internal structures, their 
composition and local personalities. In addition, external pressures can change university 
governance. In Australia, there was external pressure towards greater managerialism, 
attempting to streamline decision-making. This pressure became stronger with each 
review of higher education from 1988 to 2002.  
As a historical background to these changes, Bessant (2002) charts the demise of 
collegiality in Australian universities and relates it to the general decline of professorial 
authority in university governance and the emergence of corporate management 
structures. He notes that Academic Boards or Councils “were mostly reduced to briefing 
sessions and in some universities by-passed altogether” (2002, p. 7). The corporate 
management initiatives derived legitimacy from federal reviews demanding stronger 
governance in universities. The Dawkins’ (1988) White Paper (named after the former 
Minister of Education during the Labor Government’s period in power from the 1980s to 
the early 1990s) favored stronger managerial modes of operation and specifically referred 
to streamlining decis ion-making. The Hoare Report (1995) reiterated the need for 
management reform. Then the West Review (1998) made more specific statements, 
arguing for governing bodies of between 10 and 15 members. Most often these reports 
referred to the combined lay and academic Senates; however, there was a spill-over into 
all types of decision-making bodies.  
Nelson (2002) declared in the most recent review: “There remains considerable scope 
for improvement of governance arrangements, despite the reforms of recent years. 
Boards, Councils or Senates often remain unwieldy structures, unable to provide the 
support and advice necessary to Vice-Chancellors managing a large-scale organization” 
(p. x). It seemed most perturbed about how members acted in these governing bodies. 
“Some of these members believe they are representing particular constituency interests 
rather than acting as the collective leadership of the university” (2002, p. x). Qouting a 
University of Western Sydney submission, it argued for legally codifying the duties of 
members and relating them to corporations law where the “the overriding responsibility 
of Board members is made clear” (p. 22). By this, it was evident that the government did 
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not want elected students and staff members to see themselves as representatives of their 
constituencies. 
At Murdoch there was some support for a smaller Council because of the unwieldiness 
of the debate but not because of how elected students and staff members represent their 
constituencies. To run a debate with 36 people is onerous, is subject to all sorts of 
vagaries of the way people interact. Also a committee that large really suffers from the 
social loafing, that is that people turn up and believe that someone else has done all the 
work (Thurgate). 
The checks and balances built into a representative constituency are essential for a 
university community. This move to see elected representatives as neutral members 
without political constituencies is contrary to the spirit of democratic participation. It is 
true that members should act in the best interest of the university but it is also quite 
evident that the ‘best’ interest does not mean that conflicting interests can easily 
disappear. It is better as Hoare (1995) noted to have a vigorous council and one where 
there is lively debate. Otherwise, issues are thought to be rubber-stamped and apathy and 
cynicism soon seep into the forum. 
During most of its 30-year history Murdoch’s Council was collaborative. The non-
collaborative times occurred when there was an insufficient level of trust between 
academics and the executive. As Tierney and Minor concluded in their study of 
university governance in the United States, “Apathy and lack of trust are the most 
significant barriers to meaningful faculty participation” (2003, p. 11).  
There was even a period when Council was not respected by some members of the 
Chancellery and the Senate. However, faculty did not recoil into apathy. Instead a more 
activist stance was taken and Council eventually regained its legitimacy in the eyes of 
Senate members and senior managers. This occurred with the change of vice-chancellor 
and validates one of the Tierney and Minor’s strategies for improving governance. 
Create the conditions for trust: Trust exists as a reciprocal relationship 
where both parties accept the importance of one another and have bonds of 
mutual obligation. Trust is not a “pie in the sky” value that is impossible to 
articulate. Trust is accomplished over time as a group or individual sees that 
what was said is done. (2003, p. 12) 
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The notion of trust as a two-way process points to the importance of the multiple 
actors who create the conditions for good governance. Not only are there multiple actors 
that impinge upon this trusting relationship, there are also multi- levels of decision-
making that culminate in a governing body making the final academic policy decisions. 
This means that there are various levels for faculty to become involved in governance. 
Communication of decisions is crucial so that the flow of decision making from one level 
to the next occurs smoothly and in a timely fashion.  
An area where further delineation of authority is needed in Murdoch’s Council is that 
of setting budget priorities. In Tierney and Minor’s (2003) survey, only 11 percent of 
faculty reported having a substantial level of influence over setting budget priorities. 
Even though Council has a role in this area, the ability to influence the budget seems 
negligible.   
Members of the Murdoch University community have been fortunate in avoiding the 
apathy and cynicism commonly expressed about faculty senates in the US. Currently 
Academic Council is seen as a legitimate forum that blends managerial processes, such as 
strategic planning, into its procedures. As can be seen by this brief overview of its 
history, there were times when cynicism began to weaken its legitimacy. It appears that 
one way to ensure its future legitimacy is to continue to elect activist members who 
believe in its collegial mode of operating. Moreover, if a trusting relationship continues 
to exist between the executive and the academics, then Murdoch’s Council should retain 
its reputation as one of the more robust councils in Australia.  
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